The 66AK2Gx DSP + ARM processors are designed for automotive and consumer audio, industrial motor control, smart-grid protection and other high-reliability, real-time, compute-intensive applications. This training provides an overview of the device architecture and the processor cores. It also includes training related to voice and audio processing, as well as additional how-to video topics relevant to the EVMK2G evaluation module.
TI provides key runtime software components and documentation to further ease development. TI’s online training provides an introduction to the Processor SDK and how to use this software to start building applications on TI processors.
The Programmable Real-Time Unit (PRU) is a small processor that is tightly integrated with an IO subsystem, offering low-latency control of IO pins on TI’s SoC devices including the 66AK2Gx, AM335x, AM437x, and AM57x Processors. The PRU is customer-programmable and can be used to implement simple and flexible control functions, peripherals, and state machines that directly access IO pins of the device, as well as can communicate with the application cores.
Learn about how to overcome high frequency challenges using TI's series capacitor buck converter.
This section covers wireless network trends, key technologies, and problem statements for smart grid IoT.
This section covers system-level examples for wireless networks on smart grid IoT. We will provide software- and system-level details for two system examples: 6LoWPAN-Contiki and sub-1GHz sensor to cloud industrial IoT gateway reference design.
This section summarizes the wireless network challenges and solutions for a smarter grid IoT training series.
Tune in to learn more about meter tampering, why it is a problem for utility providers and some common ways a meter is tampered.
The first line of defense against tampering by bypassing current, reversing connections, and disconnecting leads is the meter case. Due to this, it is common for utilities to require some form of intrusion detection system to detect when someone opens a case. In this section, we will cover how to detect someone trying to open the case of a meter.
For anti-tampering, it is common to try to detect the presence of a strong magnet. In this section, we will cover the use of hall sensors for low-power detection of strong magnetic fields in three dimensions. Details on our magnetic tamper detection reference design, TIDA-00839, will be provided as well as some of the design considerations that were kept in mind when creating this reference design.
In this section, we will cover how to harden a meter against these magnetic tamper attacks by using shunts for current sensors. For poly-phase implementations, I will go over how to use isolated delta sigma modulators to add the necessary isolation to use shunt current sensors and create magnetically immune poly-phase energy measurement systems. The TIDA-00601 and TIDA-01094 reference designs, which show how to implement a poly-phase isolated shunt measurement system, will be discussed as well as the associated AMC1304 high-side power supplies used in these designs.
In this section, a summary of the entire Anti-tamper Techniques to Thwart Attacks on Smart Meters training series will be covered. This summary includes the Detecting Case Tamper Attacks Using Inductive Switches, Detecting Magnetic Tampering Using Hall-effect Sensors and Hardening a Meter Against Magnetic Tamper Attacks sections of the training series.